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THE END OF INDETERMINACY IN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Carla D. Pratt*
I. INTRODUCTION
After bracing for a decision overruling Grutter v. Bollinger,1 the
proponents of race-conscious affirmative action in higher education were
relieved by the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin.2 To the surprise of many, a seven justice
majority3 left most of Grutter intact and issued an opinion that allowed
race-conscious affirmative action to continue. 4 However, the Court’s
opinion in Fisher does alter Grutter as precedent and will constrain the
ability, and perhaps willingness, of colleges and universities to use race
in admissions and other processes moving forward. This Essay urges
higher education administrators to view Fisher as signaling the need for
change in the manner in which higher education admissions are
conducted. Fisher’s retreat from balancing First Amendment interests
against Fourteenth Amendment interests in the application of the strict
scrutiny standard will increase the cost of doing race-conscious work in
higher education. The result is that colleges and universities will have to
do substantial work to justify their decision to use race-conscious
admission processes.
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Nancy J. LaMont Faculty Scholar, the
Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. I would like to thank the
Valparaiso Law Review for hosting this Symposium to examine the role of diversity in the
legal profession and for inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank my research
assistant Susanna Bagdasarova for her able research assistance.
1
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
3
Id. at 2414. Justice Ginsburg dissented, reasserting her argument in Gratz v. Bollinger
that because the Ten Percent Plan is specifically designed to produce racial diversity, it is
race consciousness that drives the Ten Percent Plan. Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303–04 & n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Therefore, it is not a “race neutral” plan. Id. She stated “only an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives [such as the Ten Percent Plan] as race unconscious.” Id.
(citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303–04 & n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). She warned that, if the
Court does not permit the consideration of race as a factor in higher education admissions,
many universities might “‘resort to camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”
Id. (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Justice Kagan recused herself
and did not participate in consideration of the case or writing the decision. Id. at 2422; see
Eboni S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL.
U. L. REV. 519, 521 n.11 (2014) (discussing the composition of the Court when it decided
Fisher).
4
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419, 2421 (asserting that the Court would not revisit Grutter
and remanding for the lower court to determine whether the university’s plan satisfied
strict scrutiny requirements).
*
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Schools will be asked to demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives
do not yield the educational benefits of diversity that the use of race can
achieve.5 In this vein, it is foreseeable that courts might demand that
universities prove that race-neutral types of diversity, such as
geographic and socio-economic background, are inadequate proxies for
achieving the educational benefits that racial diversity delivers. In other
words, universities might be asked to prove exactly what unique work
race does in the diversity calculus that is distinct from other forms of
diversity, many of which are closely correlated with race, such as socioeconomic status (SES), geography, English as a second language, single
parent household, and other race-neutral social variables. Courts will
likely view universities’ efforts to isolate the unique contribution of race
to the diversity calculus as being based on stereotypes or essentialist
notions of race.6
Because Fisher mandates that schools engage in “‘serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,’”7 and show that “no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational
benefits of diversity,”8 courts will ask: Can’t universities achieve the
educational benefits of diversity without considering race? The Court in
Fisher stated that “[i]f ‘a nonracial approach . . . could promote the
substantial interest [in diversity] about as well and at tolerable
administrative expense,’ then the university may not consider race.”9
Accordingly courts will ask: Wouldn’t the use of race-neutral measures,
some of which may be proxies for race, 10 produce the educational
benefits of diversity about as well as the consideration of race? If a
university has students from all segments of the socio-economic strata;
students from rural areas as well as urban and suburban areas; students
from homes where English is not the primary language spoken in the
home; students from single-parent households; students who are the first
generation in their family to attend college; students who are the first in
their family to complete high school; and students who are first
5
Id. at 2420 (“[S]trict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of
demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral
alternatives do not suffice.”).
6
For an explanation of racial essentialism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 608–12 (1990).
7
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003)).
8
Id.
9
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
Interestingly, the Court in Fisher seemed to have no problem with the fact that the
facially race-neutral Ten Percent Plan used in Texas was designed with the purpose of
operating as a proxy for race. See id. at 2416 (describing the facially neutral Ten Percent
Plan and how it “resulted in a more racially diverse environment at the University”).
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generation U.S. citizens, students who are not U.S. citizens, and students
who possess talents other than academics such as art, music, or athletics,
then shouldn’t that university be able to achieve the educational benefits
that flow from diversity without considering anyone’s race in the
admissions process? If the answer is “no” then the question becomes:
What does race get you that these other facially race neutral factors do
not?
In light of this shift in the demand for justification of the use of race
in admissions, some colleges and universities may decide that the
resources necessary for compliance with Fisher are too great or that the
risk of improperly administered race-conscious admissions is too high to
continue the practice of race-conscious affirmative action in admissions.
However, if racial diversity truly enhances the education we deliver to
all students, as Grutter seems to acknowledge,11 those of us concerned
with delivering the best possible education to students will invest the
resources necessary to maintain the educational benefits that flow from a
racially diverse student body.
II. WHERE FISHER DEVIATES FROM GRUTTER
Grutter applied equal protection’s strict scrutiny framework but took
account of the First Amendment interest that colleges and universities
have in maintaining academic freedom, which necessarily encompasses
the ability to decide who to admit to the student body. 12 In applying the
equal protection framework, the Grutter Court balanced that interest in
academic freedom against the individual applicant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from racial discrimination.13 In doing so,
Grutter permitted courts to afford deference to the judgments of higher
education institutions on both prongs of the strict scrutiny test. 14 Legal
scholars generally interpreted Grutter as affording deference to the
University of Michigan Law School on both the issue of whether
diversity was a compelling governmental interest and whether the use of
race was narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling governmental
interest.15 In the years following Grutter, legal scholars argued for and
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330, 343 (2003) (recognizing the benefits that flow
from a diverse student body).
12
Id. at 326, 329.
13
Id. at 326, 329–30.
14
Id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better than
to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions
program as soon as practicable.”).
15
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (interpreting Grutter and Gratz as affording
deference on the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test and asserting that the
11
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against the application of deference on both prongs of the strict scrutiny
test.16 Some argued that the deference afforded to institutions of higher
education in admission decision-making was appropriate in light of the
institutions’ First Amendment interest in academic freedom.17
Balancing the constitutional interests of the First Amendment against
those of the Fourteenth Amendment was not a novel approach to
constitutional interpretation at the time that Grutter was decided.18
Contrary to Justice Thomas’s assertion in his concurrence in Fisher that
“Grutter was a radical departure from [the Court’s] strict-scrutiny
precedents,”19 Grutter properly took account of the fact that universities
have First Amendment interests in academic freedom and appropriately
incorporated those constitutional interests into the Fourteenth
Amendment strict scrutiny test by calling for deference to educational
judgments when strict scrutiny is applied to an academic institution’s
activities that fall within the penumbra of academic freedom.20 Even
after Grutter, the Court acknowledged that universities should be treated
somewhat differently than other government actors in an equal
In explaining why K–12 public school
protection analysis.21
Court deviated from equal protection precedent when it failed to scrutinize whether the
law school used the “minimum necessary racial preference” to meet its educational goal of
a diverse student body).
16
See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational
Autonomy and Expert Judgments in Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133, 1136–38 (2013)
(asserting that courts should afford academic institutions deference on both prongs of the
strict scrutiny test).
17
See, e.g., Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”:
Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 222–23
(2011) (“[C]ourts should apply academic freedom only to legitimately academic,
ideologically neutral decisions of a university, and should afford different amounts of
deference based on how much academic expertise the decision required and whose rights
the decision places at stake.”).
18
See Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be Lawyers?: Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal
Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 857, 867–77 (2003) (arguing that the admission of racists to
the bar privileges the First Amendment right of free speech of whites over the Fourteenth
Amendment right of people of color to be free from racial discrimination in the
administration of justice). See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim’s Story, in MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (1993) (asserting that
extending the First Amendment to protect racist hate speech privileges the constitutional
interests of whites over the interests of people of color in being free from harm imposed by
racially harmful speech).
19
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2423 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
20
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003).
21
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 770–71
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that features unique to higher education
justified the compelling nature of the university’s interest in attaining a diverse student
body).
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administrators’ decisions to assign children to schools in part based on
race were unconstitutional, the Court distinguished the case involving
K–12 public school children from the higher education context by stating
that “in light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.’” 22
Nonetheless, the Court’s decision in Fisher repositions public
universities by aligning them more with other government actors that
lack a First Amendment interest in the performance of their
governmental function. This repositioning of public universities and
colleges diminishes their special position in constitutional
jurisprudence.23 Fisher resolves the deference debate by rejecting an
application of strict scrutiny that affords deference to higher education
institutions on both prongs of the strict scrutiny test. 24 Instead, Fisher
constrains judicial deference to the first prong of the test—specifically
whether achieving the educational benefits of student body diversity is a
compelling governmental interest.25 Moreover, the Court in Fisher makes
clear that some—but not total—deference is appropriate in determining
whether the institution of higher education has asserted a compelling
governmental interest.26 As a result of Fisher’s interpretation of Grutter,
courts are now permitted to afford some—but not total—deference to a
school’s educational judgment that racial diversity is essential to its
educational mission, but a court is not permitted to afford deference to a
school’s judgment that its consideration of race in admissions is
narrowly tailored to achieve its diversity goal.
Fisher therefore
constrains and narrows Grutter’s holding by rejecting its more nuanced
analysis of strict scrutiny in favor of mandating that institutions of
higher education demonstrate that the consideration of race is necessary
to achieve “the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body” and that the methodology used by the school in its race-conscious
admissions program is narrowly tailored so that the consideration of
race is no greater than what is necessary to achieve the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.27 Fisher mandates that
courts second-guess the judgments of educational administrators by
delving not only into whether the consideration of race is necessary in a
Id. at 724 (majority opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (explaining that the higher education context does not
have any bearing on the strict scrutiny analysis).
24
See id. at 2419 (reasoning that Grutter supports deference only to the university’s
judgment regarding whether “a diverse student body would serve its educational goals”).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 2417, 2421.
22
23

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2014], Art. 7

540

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

given circumstance, but also whether the consideration given to race was
too great or too attenuated from its goal to be constitutionally
permissible.
Higher education administrators who wish to continue considering
race as “a ‘factor of a factor of a factor of a factor’ in the calculus” 28 for
determining admission must now be prepared to articulate with
specificity why they are considering race in their admissions processes,
how they are defining race,29 why they are choosing to be conscious of
particular races over others in admissions, to what extent race is being
considered in the admissions process, and whether the consideration of
race in admissions is actually advancing the asserted institutional goals
that are animating it. Accordingly, Fisher mandates a more probing
judicial inquiry into exactly how admissions committees manage
considerations of race.30 It asks whether the work of those admissions
committees is closely related to the institution’s asserted constitutional
goals, and when, if ever, will an institution know whether its continued
use of race-conscious admissions is unnecessary. It is no longer
sufficient for higher education institutions to invoke a general state
interest in “diversity” because that generic assertion does not tell the
Abigail Fishers of the world, or the courts, exactly which of the state’s
diversity interests are the actual reason for using a race-conscious
admissions process that admits some students, in part, due to their racial
identity.
III. FISHER AND THE INDETERMINACY OF DIVERSITY
To many, the diversity rationale rings especially hollow in the
context of a state like Texas where the state legislature has enacted a law
mandating admission to the state’s public colleges and universities for all
students graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class. 31
Id. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009)).
29
Many schools that practice race-conscious affirmative action generally apply it to
blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and sometimes some disadvantaged Asian ethnicities.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s in
a Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 809 n.17 (2011). However, these are not the only nonwhite minority groups that have small numbers of students who may confront “racial
isolation” on campus. Middle Eastern students, for example, may also find themselves
suffering isolation due to their race, ethnicity, and religion but are generally not the
beneficiaries of affirmative action policies. Schools will need to be prepared to articulate a
rationale for adopting policies aimed at alleviating “racial isolation” for some minority
student groups but not others.
30
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–20.
31
See id. at 2416 (describing the Top Ten Percent Law implemented by the Texas
legislature). Racial diversity of enrolled students at the University of Texas at Austin
28
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Because of racially segregated housing patterns, de facto racial
segregation32 persists in Texas high schools. This de facto racial
segregation was leveraged by the Texas legislature when it enacted a law
mandating that students in the top ten percent of their graduating high
school class be offered admission to state universities, including the
state’s flagship university—the University of Texas at Austin.33
If an acceptable level of diversity that encompasses racial diversity
can be achieved in Texas public higher education without resorting to
the consideration of race in admissions processes, then the consideration
of race is not necessary to achieve the compelling governmental interest
of the educational benefits that flow from diversity in higher education.
Once the consideration of race becomes unnecessary to achieve the
educational benefits of racial diversity, the consideration of race is no
longer permissible under the current constitutional test of strict
scrutiny.34 In other words, the use of race in higher education
admissions must be necessary to achieve the constitutionally permissible
goal of deriving educational benefits from diversity in order for the
consideration of race to be constitutionally permissible. To decide
whether the use of race is necessary to achieve the constitutionally
permissible goal of securing the educational benefits of diversity, one
must know exactly what government interests are embedded in the
“diversity” goal. In other words, what exactly does diversity mean for

declined between 1996 and 2003, when the university relied exclusively on the Top Ten
Percent Law to guide its admissions process. Marta Tienda et al., Closing the Gap?:
Admissions & Enrollments at the Texas Public Flagships Before and After Affirmative Action 38
(Office of Population Research Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 2003-01). The
percentage of African American students enrolled fell from 4.0% to 3.3% and the
percentage of Hispanic Americans fell from 15.8% to 13.7%. Id.
32
Unlike de jure segregation, which was racial segregation imposed by law, de facto
racial segregation occurs in public schools because of racially segregated housing patterns
that emerged during Jim Crow and persist today. See Maurice C. Daniels & Cameron Van
Patterson, (Re)considering Race in the Desegregation of Higher Education, 46 GA. L. REV. 521,
544 n.119 (2012) (“[R]acial segregation in schools is a function of residential segregation,
which is inextricably linked to socioeconomic inequalities that are related to the legacy of
Jim Crow laws, policies, and practices.”); Lino A. Graglia, Solving the Parents Involved
Paradox, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 913 & n.15 (2008) (explaining the distinction between de
jure and de facto race segregation).
33
See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2012) (“[E]ach general academic teaching
institution shall admit an applicant for admission to the institution as an undergraduate
student if the applicant graduated with a grade point average in the top 10 percent of the
student’s high school graduating class in one of the two school years preceding the
academic year for which the applicant is applying for admission . . . .”).
34
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”).
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purposes of race-conscious affirmative action in higher education?35
Does the definition of diversity change from state to state? Is it related to
the demographics of a particular state’s population? Does diversity
extend to ethnicity or merely race, and where exactly is the line between
ethnicity and race? How many racial categories are there and which
ones are or should be included in the definition of diversity? Do the
relevant racial categories included in the definition of diversity vary
depending upon the state or jurisdiction in which the institution of
higher education is operating or depending upon whether that racial
group is underrepresented in higher education or some particular
discipline, such as engineering, computer science, or agriculture?
These questions crystallize the indeterminate nature of the concept
of diversity that the Supreme Court embraced in Grutter as a compelling
governmental interest sufficient to justify the use of race in higher
education admissions decisions.36 The indeterminacy of the diversity
interest was a significant concern for the justices during the Supreme
Court oral argument in Fisher,37 and the Court indirectly addressed that
concern in the Fisher decision.38 By eliminating deference to educational
administrators on the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test,
the Court mandated exacting judicial inquiry into whether the use of
race in admissions processes is narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted
educational benefits of diversity.39 Because narrow tailoring requires a
close fit between the use of race and the goal sought to be achieved, an
inquiry into whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve the
diversity goal will necessarily become an inquiry into the nature of the
diversity interest itself.
A. The Path to Diversity
Diversity was not always the compelling governmental interest
asserted by states that used race-conscious affirmative action policies to
administer scarce state resources, such as public education. The state’s
There has been much discussion in the literature regarding the meaning of diversity.
For a primer on diversity in the legal profession generally, see Eli Wald, A Primer on
Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing
Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2011) (asserting that understanding
diversity requires paying attention to context, and that like equality, we can think of
diversity as having both formal and substantive forms).
36
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
37
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, 39–40, 51–52, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11345).
38
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“[T]his interest in securing diversity’s benefits, although a
permissible objective, is complex.”).
39
Id. at 2420.
35
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interest in considering race in allocating finite state resources was
initially remedial in nature, aimed at remedying past racial
discrimination that had shut people of color—particularly African
Americans—out of opportunities for work and education. Affirmatively
seeking to admit students from racial groups that had been excluded
from the benefits of higher education by law and social custom seemed
like an appropriate remedial measure at the time, aimed at correcting the
racial imbalance in education and employment that racial discrimination
had so firmly entrenched. However, public sentiment disfavoring
affirmative action grew as more and more people of color became
publicly visible in positions of leadership in corporate America, the
military, the government, and academia. Moreover, public debate
framed affirmative action policies as “reverse discrimination,” a practice
that systematically excluded innocent deserving whites from
opportunity, making it even more distasteful to the racial majority. 40 In
fact, it was in the context of a claim that a university’s affirmative action
policy constituted unconstitutional race discrimination that the Supreme
Court first articulated the diversity rationale as the constitutionally
permissible compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the
consideration of race in higher education admissions.41
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court found that
the race-conscious admissions program at the Medical School at
University of California at Davis (“the University”) was an
unconstitutional quota because the school set aside a certain number of
seats in the entering class for certain disadvantaged minority groups that
were underrepresented in the field of medicine.42 The Court rejected the
University’s asserted state interests that were remedial in nature but
accepted that a diverse student body encouraged a “robust exchange of
ideas” and was therefore a sufficiently compelling governmental interest
to justify the consideration of race if the consideration of race was
necessary to achieve that interest. 43 The Court held that a totally
separate admissions program for racial minorities was not a necessary
means of achieving the compelling governmental interest of diversity
and pointed institutions of higher education to the Harvard admissions
See Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 533–43 (1982) (providing an in-depth discussion of the reverse
discrimination argument against affirmative action); Martin Schiff, Reverse Discrimination
Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights
Laws, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 628 (1985) (“‘Equal protection’ has . . . come to mean
‘reverse discrimination’ . . . .”).
41
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12, 314 (1978).
42
Id. at 274–76, 379.
43
Id. at 307–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
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program, which considered race as one of several factors but did not
impose an admission quota in connection with race. 44 Hence, after Bakke,
lawyers advocating for the continuation of race-conscious affirmative
action have had to tread carefully to avoid defining the diversity interest
with such specificity that it could be deemed an unconstitutional quota.
The concern of the white majority about the fairness of affirmative
action grew during the 1990s45 with race-conscious affirmative action in
higher education being viewed as “race-based preferences”46 rather than
race-conscious action aimed at alleviating the lock-in market effects of
generations of white racial preference in higher education. 47 At the turn
of the millennium, race-conscious affirmative action had lost even more
support from the white majority, and even some people of color began to
openly challenge it, lodging concerns that it stigmatized its beneficiaries
as incompetent, undeserving beneficiaries of a government handout. 48

Id. at 316–17.
Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt
Hall, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2241, 2253 (2000); see Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1040 (1998) (“A political backlash against affirmative action dates back at
least to the shift of working-class white Democrats to the Republican Party in the first
Reagan election.”).
46
Barbara J. Flagg, Diversity Discourses, 78 TUL. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004). Flagg asserts that
racial “‘preferences’ and ‘harms to whites’ are of the essence of affirmative action
discourse.” Id. at 846.
47
See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 31, 32–33 (2003) (arguing that the practice of charging private fees to finance
public education exemplifies the “market lock-in”) [hereinafter Roithmayr, Locked in
Inequality]. For an in-depth discussion of the lock-in model of racial inequality, see Daria
Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727
(2000) [hereinafter Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry]; Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical
Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2004) [hereinafter Roithmayr, Tacking Left].
The lock-in model of racial inequality Roithmayr developed is used to explain how white
racial monopolies formed historically and became self-reinforcing over time such that they
became a persistent and permanent part of the American economic landscape, thereby
creating the supremacy of whites in wealth, housing, education, healthcare, and other areas
of life. Id. at 193, 201. These early mover advantages afforded to whites are now locked
into the marketplace such that they can reproduce racial inequality indefinitely unless there
are laws and public policies specifically aimed at dismantling white advantage. Id. at 193–
94. Roithmayr does not see the current crumbs-off-the-table, small-scale model of
affirmative action in higher education as sufficient in scope to disrupt white racial privilege
in education or any other area. Id. at 192–93. Nonetheless, she acknowledges that
something is better than nothing, especially for the few people of color who are direct
beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action in higher education. Id. at 192.
48
Perhaps the most visible proponent of the stigma concern is Justice Clarence Thomas.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (advancing the stigma argument).
44
45
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B. The Problem with Diversity
While it would come as no surprise that legal scholars who oppose
affirmative action have criticized the diversity rationale for raceconscious higher education admissions, it may surprise some to learn
that even scholars who favor affirmative action and racial inclusion have
critiqued the diversity rationale. Some have argued that the diversity
rationale is flawed because it is dislodged from the historical mooring
that generated the concept of race-conscious affirmative action. 49 These
scholars argue that affirmative action is properly defined and used as a
remedial tool to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 50
Others have argued that the diversity conception of affirmative action is
flawed because diversity, as articulated in Grutter, is a compelling
governmental interest only so long as there is what Derrick Bell would
label “interest convergence”51 between whites and students of color—
meaning that diversity is a compelling governmental interest only to the
extent that it benefits white students as well as the few students of color
who are the beneficiaries of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education.52 Still others have argued that legal conceptions of diversity
have focused exclusively on “contact diversity”—the frequency and
quality of contact between individuals of different backgrounds—rather
than “content diversity”—student exposure to diverse minority issues in
an academic context.53
The Court’s decision in Fisher suggests that the primary problem
Although
with the diversity rationale is its indeterminacy.54
indeterminacy is no stranger to constitutional jurisprudence, it does
49
See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 721 (“The diversity rationale is ambiguous in concept and
unconvincingly executed in practice; it sanctions the use of race for instrumental reasons
nominally divorced from the historical conditions that made race so toxic a criterion for
allocating governmental benefits and burdens.”).
50
See, e.g., id. at 694 (advocating for the elimination of the diversity rationale and
adoption of a “suitably constrained remedial justification”); see also Derrick Bell, Diversity’s
Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1627 (2003) (“The benefit of recognizing the value of
diversity rather than the need to remedy continuing discrimination in the business and
employment fields comes at a substantial cost.”).
51
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
52
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 50, at 1624 (noting that Grutter and Gratz, read together,
exemplify the Interest-Convergence theory); see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149
(2004) (referring to Grutter as a prime example of the Interest-Convergence theory at work).
53
Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness and Critical Mass in
Affirmative Action, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 347–48 (2011).
54
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (highlighting the
complexity of the diversity interest).
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present challenges.55 It is clear that the lawyers who invoked the
diversity rationale for affirmative action in higher education embraced
indeterminacy as a way to avoid the trap of having their client’s
affirmative action policies labeled a “quota” or “racial balancing” that
would render the consideration of race in admissions unconstitutional.
However, the effort to avoid having an affirmative action policy deemed
a quota pushed affirmative action advocates toward argumentation with
higher levels of abstraction. Diversity is a highly abstract concept, and
the use of it as the compelling governmental interest that justifies the use
of race in higher education admissions has left those seeking to defend
affirmative action in a double bind: either define it with more specificity
and risk being labeled as racial balancing or an unconstitutional quota,
or leave diversity as a relatively abstract concept and risk having the
Court find that the state has not demonstrated that the use of race is
necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.
Use of the general concept of educational diversity as a compelling
government interest has facilitated the ability of affirmative action
jurisprudence to adapt to changes in facts and circumstances in higher
education, as well as the evolving sentiments of the public surrounding
race-conscious admissions in higher education.
When empirical
evidence or social change outpaces existing understandings of law, the
use of general or abstract legal concepts reserves room for judges to
mold legal jurisprudence so that it evolves consistent with society’s
understandings and concerns. 56 By avoiding analytical precision in
articulating the state’s diversity interest, educational diversity in the
abstract served to provide a generic rationale for the maintenance of
race-conscious higher education admissions while giving higher
education institutions time to conduct the empirical research to measure
the need for race-conscious intervention as well as to gather evidence
regarding the manner and degree of intervention that is necessary and
appropriate.
Rather than add clarity to the diversity rationale, the case for
educational diversity was weakened when courts found themselves with
competing evidence about the benefits and harms of race-conscious
55
Perhaps the most vivid example of the Court’s struggle with indeterminacy is in its
jurisprudence surrounding pornography. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20–22,
24–25 (1973) (discussing the “somewhat tortured history of the Court’s obscenity decisions”
and formulating obscenity to “standards more concrete than those in the past”). However,
we also see the Court’s struggle with indeterminacy in other areas of the law as well.
56
See, e.g., Dov Fox, Interest Creep and Potential Life, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (explaining that applying the general legal concept of “child protection” may lead
judges to question whether they should turn to empirical evidence or conventional social
norms to determine the term’s application).
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affirmative action.57 Until Richard Sander’s controversial work on
affirmative action, it was simply assumed that, aside from the stigma
argument,58 race-conscious affirmative action policies generally benefit
racial minorities while burdening some individuals from the white racial
majority. Sander’s work has challenged that assumption by asserting
that race-conscious affirmative action actually harms African American
students more than it helps them by mismatching them with academic
institutions that do not teach toward their level of preparation, but rather
above their level of preparation, thereby making it more difficult for
African American students to succeed academically. 59 This mismatch
theory is further intensified, Sander asserts, when the academic
institution imposes a curve in grading, thereby making students compete

Compare Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of
Neither Party at 3–4, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1950266 (asserting that
among freshmen admitted to the University of Texas at Austin in 2009, not including those
within the Top Ten Percent system, the mean SAT score of Asians were “at the 93rd
percentile of 2009 SAT takers nationwide, whites at the 89th percentile, Hispanics at the
80th percentile, and blacks at the 52nd percentile”), with Brief of the Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, Fisher,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3308203 (“Although the[] amici attribute the[]
differences to [the university’s] race-conscious admissions policy, their claim is fatally
undermined by the fact that similar variations in SAT scores existed throughout [the
university’s] race-neutral admissions between 1997 and 2004.”).
58
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that affirmative action stigmatizes its beneficiaries and fosters the view that they
are less able to compete); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
affirmative action is “racial paternalism” that stigmatizes blacks and renders them suspect
as undeserving and unqualified). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg:
Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1343 (2008)
(reporting the findings of an empirical study concluding that “there is no statistically
significant difference in internal stigma between students of color” at law schools with
affirmative action and law schools without affirmative action in admissions, which
suggests that stigma operates and exists independently of affirmative action).
59
But see, e.g., DOROTHY H. EVENSEN & CARLA D. PRATT, THE END OF THE PIPELINE: A
JOURNEY OF RECOGNITION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2012) (reporting the findings of a qualitative study of African American lawyers who
entered the profession since the new millennium). See generally RICHARD H. SANDER &
STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED
TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004) [hereinafter
Sander, A Systematic Analysis]; Richard Sander, Mismatch and the Empirical Scholars Brief, 48
VAL. U. L. REV. 555 (2014) (reiterating and defending the mismatch theory) [hereinafter
Sander, Empirical Scholars Brief]. No participants of Evensen and Pratt’s study viewed
affirmative action as a policy that harmed them. Preston Green, Affirmative Action: A Tool
for Rebuilding the K–12 Segment of the Pipeline, in THE END OF THE PIPELINE: A JOURNEY OF
RECOGNITION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERING THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra, at 139, 139.
57
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against one another for a grade.60 Sander’s work suggests that the
educational benefits derived from diversity achieved through raceconscious affirmative action may be outweighed by the harms of race
conscious-affirmative action; harm to not only those whose race is not
affirmatively sought by admissions policies, but harm to the intended
beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action.61 Sander’s work
suggests that race-conscious affirmative action may actually hinder or
hurt the educational achievement of the racial minorities that it is
intended to help.62 If Sander’s thesis is accepted by the courts,63 the use
of race-conscious affirmative action in higher education admissions will
be deemed to cause an academic mismatch that results in a larger
percentage of minority students either failing or underperforming
academically when compared to white students. Consequently, a court
confronted with university data showing underperformance of racial
minority students will be less likely to give deference to the claim that
there are educational benefits that flow from racial diversity sufficient to
elevate it to the status of a compelling government interest.
The Fisher decision’s prohibition of affording deference on the
narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test will push lawyers to
unpack the content of diversity and articulate its meaning with more
specificity. The demand for specificity in the articulation of the diversity
60
See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 51 (“Once, when a student told me about his
course load, I observed that he was in a lot of tough classes graded on mandatory curves.
That was true, he responded, but a couple of them were ‘safeties.’ I asked him what that
meant. A little embarrassed, he said that was a term for a class that had enough black and
Hispanic students to absorb the low grades on the curve.”).
61
Sander, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 59, at 371.
62
Id.
63
Many argue that Sander’s mismatch thesis is not correct. See, e.g., David L. Chambers
et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical
Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1868 (2005) (refuting the mismatch
theory by claiming “Sander misinterprets his own results and vastly overstates what his
data show”); andré douglas pond cummings, “Open Water”: Affirmative Action, Mismatch
Theory and Swarming Predators—A Response to Richard Sander, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795, 801–02
(2006) (arguing that “the manner, logic and number of criticisms levied against [Sander’s]
statistical analysis that his study is numerically, methodologically and mathematically
flawed” highlights the inaccuracies of his study); Cheryl I. Harris & William C. Kidder, The
Black Student Mismatch Myth in Legal Education: The Systemic Flaws in Richard Sander’s
Affirmative Action Study, 46 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 102, 102 (2005) (stating that the basic
premise of the mismatch theory has been refuted “[t]ime and time again”); Kevin R.
Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 15 (2005)
(suggesting the academic performance of African American law students results from their
learning environment rather than the mismatch effect); Onwuachi-Willig & Fricke, supra
note 29, at 830 (arguing that “a differential in LSAT score . . . does not harm the student due
to a ‘mismatch effect’”).
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interest will arise because the need to consider race, the degree to which
it is considered, and the manner in which it is considered are all closely
tied to the diversity goal that the higher education institution articulates.
In other words, now that the Court is requiring exacting judicial inquiry
into the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test, judicial
assessment of whether the consideration of race is narrowly tailored will
become even more closely connected to the asserted compelling
governmental interest of achieving the educational benefits of racial
diversity. If a school’s consideration of race in admissions weighs so
heavily that the academic dismissal rate for black students at the school
is significantly higher than the dismissal rate of whites at the school or
the dismissal rate of blacks at schools that do not use race-conscious
affirmative action, it could indicate that the use of race is not achieving
the desired educational benefits for this group of students. While
debunking racial stereotypes and preventing racial isolation are
important educational goals, those goals are not so compelling when
pitted against the paramount goals of minimizing academic attrition and
maximizing graduation rates. The Court in Fisher asserted that the
pursuit of “diversity for its own sake” is the equivalent of
unconstitutional racial balancing.64 This means that diversity will only
serve as a compelling governmental interest if it is the means by which a
school achieves certain educational benefits. Embedded in the diversity
interest are several different types of state interests, 65 including:
1) the state’s interest in debunking racial stereotypes;66
2) the interest in preventing racial isolation and racial
representation of racial minorities where minority students feel
pressure to speak on behalf of their entire race in class;67
3) the state’s interest in teaching cultural competence and “crossracial understanding;”68
4) the state’s interest in including diverse perspectives in classroom
dialogue;69
5) the state’s interest in creating a racially diverse workforce for the
labor market;70

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424 (2013).
Although these interests sometimes overlap and are interconnected, I articulate them
separately for clarity.
66
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
67
Id. at 319.
68
Id. at 330.
69
Id.
70
Id.
64
65
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6) the interest in creating diverse leadership for America’s military,
which promotes the state’s interest in security; 71
7) the state’s interest in enhancing democracy by preparing persons
from all segments of the American polity for citizenship and
leadership in American democracy; 72
8) the state’s interest in maintaining the institutional legitimacy of
the state’s educational institutions and in not being viewed as
maintaining institutions that perpetuate elitism and white
supremacy;73
9) the state’s interest in providing equal access to education and in
achieving racial equality in educational outcomes; 74
10) the state’s interest in improving interracial relations and
facilitating racial cooperation;75
11) the state’s interest in having the institutional culture of its
universities reflect the diversity of the state; 76 and
12) the state’s interest in promoting colorblindness.77
Fisher’s narrow articulation of the diversity interest suggests that
only the state’s interests in diversity, which yield a significant
educational benefit to the student body, will suffice as a compelling
government interest under the strict scrutiny test. Under this narrow
conception of constitutionally permissible diversity, the state’s interest in
making public-funded higher education equally accessible to all races or
achieving racial equality in educational outcomes arguably would not be
a sufficient state interest in diversity to constitute a compelling

Id. at 331.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
73
See Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter’s Open Doors: What the University of
Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78
TEMP. L. REV. 543, 566–68 (2005) (discussing legitimacy-enhancing as a rationale for racial
diversity).
74
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action
and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative
Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 1, 14–26 (1994) (arguing that affirmative action
should be discussed within the context of affording equal opportunities for minorities
rather than affording preferences as compensation for past injustice).
75
Brief for Respondents at 6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345).
76
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity? Silence at Boalt Hall:
The Dismantling of Affirmative Action, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1149, 1162–63 (2003) (positing seven
ways of conceptualizing the utility of diversity in affirmative action argumentation).
77
Id. at 1157. Carbado and Gulati argue that racial diversity on college campuses
“promotes colorblindness by rendering the racial identities of non-White students less
salient.” Id.
71
72
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governmental interest because that interest does not generate educational
benefits for the school’s student body.
By ignoring the notion that public institutions of higher education
have a duty to the public as well as a duty to the students they enroll, the
Court has overlooked one of the core missions of public colleges and
universities, which is to provide education to the diverse citizenry of the
state.78 By constraining the diversity interest to only the interest in using
diversity to achieve educational benefits, the Court has created an
unnecessary disjuncture between public and educational interests in
diversity in higher education. In particular, the concern is that the Court
has invaded academic freedom by redefining and restricting the
educational mission of public higher education. By narrowing the
mission of public higher education to the interests of what happens in
classrooms and to educational outcomes such as graduation and attrition
rates, the Court minimizes the other roles of public colleges and
universities. In reality, many public educational institutions have a
mission to conduct research, participate in community and economic
development in the state, and educate individuals from all segments of
For example, as a “state related” university, Pennsylvania State University:
has awarded more than a half-million degrees, and has been
Pennsylvania’s largest source of baccalaureate degrees at least since
the 1930s. Although the University is privately chartered by the
Commonwealth, it was from the outset considered an “instrumentality
of the state,” that is, it carries out many of the functions of a public
institution and promotes the general welfare of the citizenry.
Mission and Character, PENN STATE, http://www.psu.edu/this-is-penn-state/leadershipand-mission/mission-and-character (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). Penn State articulates its
mission as follows:
Penn State is a multicampus public research university that educates
students from Pennsylvania, the nation and the world, and improves
the well being and health of individuals and communities through
integrated programs of teaching, research, and service.
Our
instructional mission includes undergraduate, graduate, professional,
and continuing education offered through both resident instruction
and online delivery. Our educational programs are enriched by the
cutting edge knowledge, diversity, and creativity of our faculty,
students, and staff. Our research, scholarship, and creative activity
promote human and economic development, global understanding,
and progress in professional practice through the expansion of
knowledge and its applications in the natural and applied sciences,
social sciences, arts, humanities, and the professions.
As
Pennsylvania’s land-grant university, we provide unparalleled access
and public service to support the citizens of the Commonwealth. We
engage in collaborative activities with industrial, educational, and
agricultural partners here and abroad to generate, disseminate,
integrate, and apply knowledge that is valuable to society.
Id.
78
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the state’s population.79 By constraining the diversity interest of
universities to the educational benefits derived from diversity, the Court
improperly constrains the academic freedom of universities to define
their missions more broadly. Educators in the higher education arena
have a responsibility for the quality of education, which includes
instruction, research, and outreach.
Quality education implies a
responsibility for inclusive education, but the Court in Fisher
unfortunately overlooked this obligation.
IV. CONCLUSION
With increasing public hostility toward race-conscious affirmative
action, it comes as no surprise that the Court would seek to sharpen and
refine the parameters surrounding the use of race in higher education
admissions. As a result of Fisher, the strict scrutiny test, as applied to
institutions of higher education, has become more exacting in its
demands. The Court now expects colleges and universities to be able to
articulate—and prove80—exactly what educational benefits flow from the
racial diversity a school aims to achieve. Moreover, the Court expects
colleges and universities to be able to articulate how the schools know
when they have achieved sufficient racial diversity or “critical mass”
such that the educational benefits of racial diversity are achieved and
further consideration of race would be unnecessary and therefore
unconstitutional.81 By subordinating the First Amendment interests of
institutions of higher education, Fisher sharpens the double bind for
educators and affirmative action practitioners who assert that critical
mass is necessary82 but at the same time must avoid asserting a
Penn State embraces this mission, which is why it has twenty-four campuses spread
across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. This geographic diversity in the location of
campuses indicates a recognition that not everyone who desires higher education has the
privilege of being able to relocate to state college and ensures that a Penn State education is
accessible to people all across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
80
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–18, 2420 (2013) (making clear
that schools bear the burden of proving what educational benefits flow from diversity and
that they cannot achieve those benefits without considering the race of applicants).
Moreover, once a school proves that it cannot achieve the benefits of racial diversity
through race-neutral means, the school must still show that it cannot achieve the level of
racial diversity necessary to derive the benefits of diversity without the consideration of
race. Id. at 2420.
81
See id. at 2418 (“Strict scrutiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that
its ‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use
of the classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose.’” (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)).
82
See Bowen, supra note 53, at 344 (supporting affirmative action and functional
diversity in higher education and arguing that “institutional over-reliance on [critical mass]
79
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numerical range that would equate to an unconstitutional quota or
unconstitutional racial balancing which the Court found to be present in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.83
If race-conscious affirmative action is to survive as a constitutionally
permissible policy, lawyers will have to become more specific in the
articulation of the diversity interest. To enable lawyers to do that,
educators will have to rethink the way they conduct admissions. While
“‘[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable raceneutral alternative,’”84 future courts may hold that it does require trying
at least one plausible race-neutral alternative before resorting to raceconscious measures for achieving diversity.
Trying a colorblind
approach in admissions would also arm a school with data to help prove
that a colorblind approach does not come close to achieving the same
educational benefits derived from race-conscious diversity. Colleges and
universities will certainly need to define the educational goals that they
seek to achieve through racial diversity and should give some thought to
how they would define and defend the goal of achieving critical mass.
Colleges and universities must be able to connect their educational
missions to the need for racial diversity, show that race-neutral measures
yield insufficient racial diversity, and provide data that shows the
educational benefits derived from racial diversity cannot be achieved
through a colorblind approach. Universities will need to track and
record the effectiveness of race-conscious strategies and compare the
outcomes those strategies produced to the outcomes achieved in a raceneutral context. Finally, universities will need to develop policies
may actually stymie” the achievement of the educational benefits sought from racial
diversity). Bowen’s empirical research reveals that, of those studied, “only about a third of
[minority] students encountered the benefits of increased racial understanding and
decreased racial stereotyping.” Id. at 340. Bowen urges institutions of higher education to
make better use of racial diversity on campus by becoming race-conscious and abandoning
the over-reliance on critical mass to do the work of diversity. Id. at 344. Dorothy Brown
made a similar call to colleges and universities soon after Grutter was decided by urging
universities, law schools in particular, to put diversity to work in classrooms. Dorothy A.
Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously: Getting Beyond the Numbers, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006); see
Carla D. Pratt, Taking Diversity Seriously: Affirmative Action and the Democratic Role of Law
Schools: A Response to Professor Brown, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 55, 59 (2006) (urging law schools to
put diversity to work by embracing a mission that recognizes not only the goal of student
education, but also the role of the law school in diversifying the legal profession and the
law school’s goal in advancing racial diversity in the profession); see also Camille deJorna,
Deaning in a Different Voice: Not the Same Old Song, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 653–58 (2014)
(discussing the positive impact of diversity in the realm of deans in higher education).
83
See 551 U.S. 701, 709–10, 732 (2007) (plurality opinion) (holding that a school
assignment plan that sought to achieve a certain measure of racial diversity in each of the
respective public schools in the district was unconstitutional racial balancing).
84
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
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regarding the frequency with which they will re-evaluate the need to use
race. Every four years might be an adequate starting point, since that is
the typical duration for the pursuit of undergraduate degrees; every
seven years might be appropriate for law schools that undergo a process
of self-study in anticipation of sabbatical inspections by accrediting
bodies. In making these modest changes to admissions policies and
processes, perhaps universities can explain to the Abigail Fishers of the
world, and ultimately the courts, precisely what educationally relevant
state interests are embedded in the diversity interest, thus justifying the
consideration of race in any given context of higher education
admissions.
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